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THE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA
The public corporation is a common device to carry on governmental
activities in the British Commonwealth, Europe and the United States.' It has
been the uniformly favored instrument of nationalization policies.
2 The rea-
son for the use of such a public body is "unquestionably due to the realization
that it offers the most convenient though by no means the only method for a
successful application in public enterprise of principles of business efficiency
developed in the private field." 3 The necessarily extensive dealings of private
citizens with such corporations force the courts to face promptly the problem
of the legal status of such bodies. The problem is raised at this time not only
because of the general interest in the events taking place in England but
also because of the contrasting viewpoints shown in the English and
American solutions of the same problems. Furthermore, some recent statutory
developments in the United States indicate a movement toward a more uniform
control over public agencies and have apparently resulted in some contraction
of the amenability to suit of government corporations. This note will be de-
voted to a study of the legal liability of public corporations in England and
the United States as determined by various criteria, and an analysis of the
results of the application of these criteria in protecting private citizens in their
dealings with the steadily increasing numbers of such public instrumentalities.
The first consideration must be whether or not these public bodies have
an identity with the sovereign which permits them to partake of the sovereign's
immunity. Under English law, the King can do no wrong; unless the Crown
is mentioned in a statute it is understood that the statute does not include the
1. See Sellar, Government Corporations, 24 CAN. B. REv. 393, 489 (1946);
Mitchell, Australian Aspects of Government Corporations, 24 CAN. B. REv. 793 (1946);
the digest of Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth in 20 AusT.-L.
J. 76 (1946); GORDON, THE PUBLIC CORPORATION IN GREAT BRITAIN (1938). For
bibliography on government corporations in the United States see infra note 53.
2. Pinkney, Nationalization of Key Industries and Credit in Francet After the
Liberation, 62 POL. Sci. Q. 368 (1947) ; Friedmann, The New Public Corporations and
the Law, 10 MOD. L. RExv. 233, 377 (1947) ; Robson, The Administration of Nationalized
Industries in Britain, 7 PUB. ADAlN. REV. 161 (1947); Plummer, The London Pas-
senger Transport Act of 1933: A New Socialization, 48 Q. J. EcoN. 181 (1933);
O'BRIEN, BRITISH EXPERIMENTS IN GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (1937).
3. Lilienthal & Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal Gov-
ernment, 54 HARV. L. REV. 545, 559 (1941). "It is of the very essence of the conception
of a public corporation, in both the British and American legal systems, that it should
have its own funds and be autonomous for purposes of management, efficiency, auditing
and accounting, but that it should be responsible to Parliament as its 'shareholder' repre-
sentiog the nation." Friedmann, Legal Status of Incorporated Public Authorities, 22
AurT. L. J. 7, 11 (1948). "[A]n important if not the chief reason for employing these
incorporated agencies was to enable them to employ commercial methods and to conduct
their operations with a freedom supposed to be inconsistent with accountability to the
Treasury under its established procedure of audit and control over the financial trans-
actions of the United States." Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl,
275 U. S. 1, 8, 48 Sup. Ct. 12, 72 L. Ed. 131 (1927).
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Crown in its coverage. In addition, the Crown is not to be subjected to legal
process without its permission.
4
This idea of "The Shield of the Crown" was transplanted to America
*so far as its application was concerned, but the rationalizing of the concept
created some difficulty. The maxim to the effect that the King can do no
wrong was declared to be inapplicable to the American constitutional system.6
It was no degradation for the government to appear in court 7 nor could it be
maintained that the government's liability to legal process might undermine
its security and efficiency.8 Mr. Justice Holmes found the answer to lie on the
simple ground that a sovereign is exempt from suit, "not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends." 9 As a previous court had pointed out, it was not
likely that the creator of the courts had intended that it would have to defend
itself from assaults in these very courts.10
That the doctrine of governmental immunity is on the wane has been
evident, but only in the last few years has its complete abolition been fore-
sieeable." Statutory enactments such as the Crown Proceedings Act of 194712
and the Federal Tort Claims Act 18 represent the present status of the law. 14
Recent state statutes siinilarly show this trend.1 Such acts are not decisive as
to the legal status of any particular public corporation but are indicative of the
general attitude adopted by the government in respect to its own amenability
to legal process.
THE PUBLIC CORPORATION IN ENGLAND
The use of public corporations in England to carry out the nationaliza-
4. For a detailed study of the exemptions and special protections that have been
accorded to Crown servants from as early as Saxon times see Churchill, The Crown and
Its Servants, 42 L. Q. REv. 81, 212, 382 (1926).
5. See The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 474-79 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
6. Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 25 L. Ed. 1010 (1880) ; United States
v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. Ed. 171 (1882).
7. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. Ed. 171 (1882).
8. Ibi& But see dissent by Mr. Justice Gray, 106 U. S. at 223, 226.
9. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205.U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 51 L. Ed. 834
(1907).
10. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 206, 27 L. Ed. 171 (1882).
11. For a historical study of the gradual withdrawal from absolute immunity see
Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L. Q. REv. 141, 280 (1922).
Holdsworth urged extension of liability to cover tortious acts on the ground that such
a move would be in accord with the "principle which has guided the development of the
subject's remedies against the Crown throughout their history-the principle that their
competence should, so far as possible, be coextensive with the remedies available to one
subject against another." Id. at 296. See also Laski, The Responsibility of the State it
England, 32 HARv. L. REv. 447 (1919). An early attack on the theory in America was
by Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Wilder, 28 Fed. Cas. 601, No. 16,694 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1838).
12. 10 & 11 Go. VI, c. 44.
13. 60 STAT. 842 (1946), 28 U. S. C. A. § 921 (Supp. 1948).
14. The limitations of these two acts are indicated infra notes 47, 48, and 87 et seq.
15. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 26 CAN. B. REV. 399 (1948).
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tion policies of the Labor Government has very sharply raised the problem of
the legal status of these bodies. At the present time, the coal industry is in the
hands of the National Coal Board,16 all the railroad and canal undertakings
have vested in the British Transport Commission,17 and the assets of all
generators and suppliers of electricity have been transferred to the British
Electricity Authority or to one of its subordinate area boards.' 8 Overseas
airlines are in the hands of three public corporations.19 The shares of the
Bank of England have been turned over to the Treasury but the corporate
existence of the Bank continues as before.20 Many of the new social services
are being administered through such public bodies. 21 The very great powers
given the government under the Town and Country Planning Act are being
exercised by incorporated bodies.
22
The attitude of the judiciary in England towards public corporations has
in the past, with some variations in rationale, been consistent and apparently
will continue to be so by virtue of being stated with some precision in the
enabling statutes under the nationalization program. In general, a public cor-
poration in England is a complete juristic personality liable to sue and be sued
as though it were a private individual. The exception to this approach is when
the corporation is fulfilling a traditibnal function of government. And if such
a function is being carried on, the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 23 makes
such public authorities liable as though they were private individuals. This
apparently complete amenability does not remove the necessity of resolving
this problem. Corporations found to be agents of the Crown are not subject to
taxation, and litigants faced with such. corporations must contend with the
limitations of the Crown Proceedings Act.
The starting point, as indicated above, is the "Shield of the Crown."
The King is immune from suit. This immunity extends to his agents who are
acting as his representatives in the performance of royal functions. Such
agents have been distinguished by considering them as emanations of the
Crown.24 Are public corporations such agents or emanations? The basis for an
16. Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEO. VI, c. 59.
17. Transport Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEO. VI, c. 49. See Walker, The Transport Act,
1947, 58 ECON. J. 11 (1948).
18. Electricity Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEO. VI, c. 27.
19. Civil Aviation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Go: VI, c. 70.
20. Bank of England Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 27.
21. The Regional Hospital Boards created in the National Health Service Act,
1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 81, § 11(1); the Agricultural Land Commission created under
the Agriculture Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 48, § 68(1).
22. Town and Country Planning Act, 1947 10 & 1
23. See note 12 supra. , 1 GEo. 
VI, c. 51.
24. "All the great officers of state are, if I way say so, emanations from the Crown.
They are delegations by the Ciown of its own authority to particular individuals." Gilbert
v. Corporation of Trinity House, 17 Q. B. D., 795, 801 (1886). "[I]t would avoid
obscurity in the future if the words agent or servant were used in preference to the
inappropriate and undefined word 'emanation.'" International Ry. Co. v. Niagara Parks
Commission, [1941] A. C. 328, 343 (P. C.).
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answer to this question is found in the limited view formerly taken in EngJish
political theory of the proper sphere of government. "When it passes beyond
the obvious duties of a constitutional government as the preserver of order
and the administrator of justice, and embarks upon enterprises having for
their object the material, moral or intellectual welfare of the community, the
agencies upon which it casts these functions, though exercising them for
national purposes, have readily been regarded as independent persons with the
ordinary legal attributes." 25 The mere fact of public purpose is immaterial in
determining the legal liability of these corporations. Other factors have at one
time or another been decisive in determining the presence or absence of lia-
bility.
The Mersey Docks Trust in Liverpool was a public corporation that
was one of the major testing grounds for many of the problems that arose in
connection with the legal status of these public bodies. In 1864 it was made
subject to the poor rates because the corporate property was not occupied for
"purposes of the country." 26 Two years later, it was made clear that any
public corporation organized for a trading or other profitable purpose was to
be subject to liability to the extent of its corporate funds just as though it
were a private individual in the same type of undertaking. 27 The reasoning
was that such a public corporation was a substitute for private enterprise
and that the Parliamentary intent was never to grant immunity to such bodies
under these circumstances. 28 This proposed test never was adequate. The
Postmaster-General is incorporated. 29 He performs functions that are a sub-
stitute for private enterprise, he may or may not make a profit, and yet lia-
bility was reached only by statute last'year under the Crown Proceedings Act.
The National Coal Board is not a substitute for private enterprise because
further private enterprise in the field is forbidden,30 and yet, by the enabling
25. Moore, Liability for Acts of Public Servants, 23 L. Q. Rlv. 12, 21 (1907).
26. Mersey Docks v. Cameron, 11 H. L. Cas. 443, 11 Eng. Rep. 1405 (1864-65). The
Commissioner of Works and Buildings was not liable for poor rates on bridge built
with public money. The property was occupied by the Crown. The Queen v. McCann,
L. R. 3 Q. B. 677 (1868). "The true ground of exemption was ascertained .. . in the
Mersey Dock Case; .. .the poor laws did not include the Crown, the Crown not being
named in the statute . . . therefore .. . Crown property, and property occupied for
purposes of the administration of the government of the country, became exempt from
liability to poor-rate." Therefore, because the functions of the University of Edinburgh
were not governmental, the property of the University was liable for the tax. Greig v.
University of Edinburgh, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 348, 354 (1868). Property used by justices
of county court was not subject to income tax. Coomber v. The Justices, 9 App. Cas.
61 (1883).
27. Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 86, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
28. "In England the test really is: Could the activity be performed by private enter-
prise? Whenever an affirmative answer can be given, the public corporation, in order to
secure any special privilege of the Crown: has to establish that the privilege is confirmed
by some statute." Sellar, Government Corporations, 24 CAN. B. REv. 393, 489, 506 (1946).
29. The Postmaster-General was made a body corporafe for the purpose of conveying
lands to his successors. 3 & 4 VIcT., c. 96, § 67 (1840).
30. The National Coal Board is charged with the duty of "working and getting the
coal in Great Britain, to the exclusion ... of any other person." Coal Industry National-
isation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEO. VI, c. 59, §1(1) (a).
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NOTES
statute, liability is complete. Further the Board has a statutory duty to make
a profit.3' Thus substitution for private enterprise and the making of a profit
are not, and apparently never have been, decisive factors in determining lia-
bility.
The suggestion has been made that incorporation itself should raise
a presumption of no immunity. 32 There are some judicial expressions in accord
with this.33 But as a definitive test, it was not usable because some of the
great departments of state were incorporated simply as a matter of adminis-
trative convenience.
34
When a basis for liability was found, these corporations became fully
liable to process. They were successfully sued in tort 35 and in contract. 36 They
gained no immunity from any sort of taxation.37 Further, if suit were allowed
against the corporation, the procedure would be much less difficult than it
would be in a similar suit against a corporation found to be an agent of the
Crown.38 Therefore, it became of prime importance to determine the exact
31. Id. §§ 1(1)(c), 4(c).
32. Friedmann, Legal Status of Incorporated Public Authorities, 22 AuST. L. 3.
7, 10 (1948).
33. Mackenzie-Kennedy v. Air Council, [19271 2 K. B. 517 (action of tort did not
lie against the Air Council which is a department of state). Atkin L. J. suggests that if
the Council were a corporation, different considerations might apply. Id. at 532.
34. See Moore, Liability for Acts of Public Servants, 23 L. Q. REV. 12, 16-17
(1907).
35. Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 86, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866) ; Gilbert
v. Corporation of Trinity House, 17 Q. B. D. 795 (1886).
36. In Graham v. Commissioners of Public Works, [1901] 2 K. B. 781, suit against
commissioners was allowed because although the "Crown is the real entity pursued, ...
for facilitating the conduct of business it is extremely convenient that the Crown should
establish officials or corporations who can speedily sue and be sued in respect of business
engagements without the formalities of the procedure necessary when a subject is seeking
redress from his Sovereign. It is desirable for the proper conduct of business that persons
who contract with the Crown for business purposes should have the same power of
appealing to His Majesty's Courts of Justice against a misconstruction of the contract
by the head of a department as any subject might have against his fellow subject." Id. at
790. For this reason suit is allowed in order to get a declaratory judgment, no execution
being possible. On this precedent these commissioners can be sued in contract but not
in tort. Roper v. Commissioners of Public Works, [1915] 1 K. B. 45.
37. Liable for income tax in Mersey Docks v. Lucas, 8 App. Cas. 891 (1883) ; for
excess profits tax in Port of London Authority v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1920]
2 K. B. 612 (C. A.).
38. "A petition of right is the process by which property of any kind (including
money or damages) is recovered from the Crown, whether the basis of the claimant's
title be legal or equitable." 9 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 688 (2d ed., Hailsham,
1933). The petition did not lie for recovery in tort. The procedure for bringing such
petition is set forth in HALSBURY, op. cit., 693 et seq. Before bringing the petition the
fiat of the Crown or permission from the Attorney-General had to be obtained. "[E]very-
body knows that that fiat is granted as a matter, I will not say, of right, but as a matter
of invariable grace by the Crown whenever there is a shadow of claim, nay, more, it is
the constitutional duty of the Attorney-General not to advise a refusal of the fiat unless
the claim is frivolous." In re Nathan, 12 Q. B. D. 461, 479 (C. A. 1884). "I personally
feel that the whole subject of proceedings against Government departments is in a very
unsatisfactory state .... I hope that the committee which is now considering the question
of proceedings against the Crown will be able to give the subject more effective remedies
against Government departments than he has at present." Scrutton L. J. in Marshall
Shipping Co. v. Board of Trade, [1923] 2 K. B. 343, 352 (C. A.). "[I]f a body, whether
incorporated or not, is in fact acting in any particular matter as agents of the Crown,
they .are to be treated as such agents, and from that it follows that the Statute of
1948]
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legal status of each corporation. The unrolling of the case law made these
determinations. It would appear that the basic factor in each case was the
precise nature of the function being performed by the incorporated body. If
a governmental function is being performed, the property being used for such
purposes is occupied for purposes of the country and is not taxable.8 0 The
Postmaster-General is not liable for the tortious acts of other persons working
in the Post Office.40 Under such circumstances all are employees of the Govern-
ment and there is no master-servant reiationship.41 The Secretary of State
for India is not liable on a pension claim. 42 An incorporated board with no
discretionary powers and with exact duties has none of the autonomy to be
expected in a separate entity.43 The measure of control exercised over the
instrumentality by the sovereign is clearly an important factor in determining
the propriety of granting the immunity of the sovereign to the public body.
44
With a limited view of what properly constituted a governmental function,
successive decisions finally segregated the two types of public corporations.
But the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions breaks
down completely with a policy of nationalizing the nation's basic industries.
This public activity is a substitute for private enterprise, but it is also clear
that it is designed to be a permanent substitute and therefore, a governmental
function. The extent of transactions involved, however, makes the substitu-
Limitations does not apply to them." Commissioners of Public Works v. Pontypridd
Masonic Hall Co., [1920] 2 K. B. 233, 234-5.
39. See note 26 supra.
40. Bainbridge v. The Postmaster-General, [1906] 1 K. B. 178 (C. A.). The tele-
graph companies of Great Britain were taken over by the Government and the Postmaster-
General was empowered to work them in connection with the administration of the Post
Office. 31 & 32 Vxc., c. 110, § 4 (1868). Suit arose over the negligence of a wire-layer
and the Postmaster-General was made a party. On motion of the Postmaster-General that
there was no cause of action against him, the court struck his name from the complaint.
41. Two other reasons were also advanced in the Bainbridge case for immunity:
(1) There was no legislative provision for funds with which to pay damages incurred
by the Postmaster-General in his official capacity. The revenue of the Government cannot
be reached in this fashion. Id. at 190. (2) The Postmaster-General was not liable in
tort before the Post Office took over the telegraph companies and there is no reason
why this immunity should not continue afterwards.'Id. at 193.
42. Kinlock v. Secretary of State for India, 15 Ch. D. 1 (C. A. 1880).
43. Sanitary Commissioners of Gibraltar v. Orfila, 15 App. Cas. 400 (P. C. 1890).
"[T]he Government ... remains in reality the principal, the Commissioners being merely
a body through whom its administration may be conveniently carried on." It was not
"the intention of the Crown, in giving the sanitary body administrative powers subject
to the control of the Governor, to impose upon it any liability." Id. at 413. In Fox v.
Government of Newfoundland, [1898] A. C. 667 (P. C.), the Government claimed that
it was a preferred creditor as to monies owed education boards by an insolvent bank. This
claim was rejected on the ground that the boards were not mere agents of the Government
but had powers of discretion to be exercised independently of the Government. In Inter-
national Ry. Co. v. Niagara Parks Commission, [1941] A. C. 328 (P. C.), words in a
contract "on their behalf" were, held to indicate a power to contract and a consequent
liability that was independent of the Government.
44. "In practice, . . . the question of immunity depends in substance on control. ...
The question is whether the central government exercises such a general direction and
control over the body in relation to its functions as to deprive it of any will of its
own, and to make it the mere instrument of the collective will of the state." Moore,
Liability for Acts of Public Servants, 23 L. Q. REv. 12, 24 (1907).
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tion of the liability of the sovereign under the Crown Proceedings Act un-
desirable because of the few remaining areas of immunity retained under the
Act. No rationale will be satisfying other than a clear statement of intent to
impose liability on such boards as though they were still in privite hands. 45
This is the modern result although it was arrived at rather deviously.
The almost complete solution in England of the problem of suing govern-
ment agencies came with the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947.46 The barriers
to suit in contract are almost completely gone.4 7 A few areas of immunity in
tort still remain. 48 Under the enabling statutes which introduced the nation-
alization program, the new corporations are specifically given no immunity
from any sort of tax.49 In short, save for the immunity of the King him-
self,6 0 every individual and public body or agent in England has practically
an equal standing in the courts. This should result in full protection for the
individual and public advantage by providing rigorous legal accountability
on the part of public servants.
5'
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATION IN AMERICA
Since 1791, government corporations have been instruments of national
activity in the United States.52 Today such public authorities have extended
their influence over great areas of activity within our economy and deal di-
rectly with great numbers of private individuals daily. That the future will
bring more of these public bodies seems inevitable. The Missouri Valley
45. "I believe it to be an unquestionable principle of legal policy in a modern demo-
cratic society in which public and private enterprise operate side by side that if the State
directly or indirectly engages in activities which may, through contract, torts, or in
other ways interfere with the life and security of the private citizen, it should as far as
possible be made legally responsible to the same extent as private legal persons." Fried-
mann, Legal Status of Incorporated Public Authorities, 22 Ausr. L. J. 7, 8 (1948).
46. 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 44.
47. The Act removes the need for securing a petition of right by permitting suit
against the Crown in all cases in which such a petition was formerly necessary. Since
this was the only method available for recovery against the Crown, the limitations on
its use, except as otherwise provided for in this Act, remain in effect. Street, Crown
Proceedings Act, 1947, 11 MoD. L. Rjw.*129, 130-2 (1948), lists four situations in which
there is still no recovery: (1) Neither a' member of the armed forces nor a civil servant
may sue the Crown for any breach of contract of employment nor for arrears of pay,
(2) all contracts made by the Crown are subject to an implied condition that the necessary
funds are granted by Parliament, (3) the Crown cannot hamper its future executive
cition, (4) quasi-contract. In 9 HALsBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND 691-2 (2d ed., Hailsham,
1933), other situations are cited.
48. The tort aspects of the Act are discussed in Barnes, The Crown Proceedings Act,
1947, 26 CAN. B. REv. 387 (1948) ; Sweet, Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 11 MoD. L.
Rxv. 129 (1948). The major omission commented upon by these writers is the continuing
immunity for breach of a statutory duty which is binding only upon the Crown.
49. Nothing in the Act "shall be deemed to exempt the Board from liability for any
tax, duty, rate, levy, or other charge whatsoever, whether general or local." Coal Industry
Nationalisation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 59, § 47; Transport Act, 1947, 10 & 11
GEo. VI, c. 49, § 10; Electricity Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 54, § 11 (1); Civil
Aviation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 70, § 6(1).
50. 10 & 11 GEO. VI, c. 44, § 40(1).
51. See notes 3 and 11 supra.
52. The Bank of the United States was incorporated in 1791. 1 STAT. 191 (1791).
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Authority is in the blueprint stage. The nationalization of some of our basic
industries is always a possibility. If atomic energy, the production and dis-
tribution of which is now a government monopoly, is made available for
extensive civilian use, such activities will be probably best handled through
the agency of a government corporation. But the present extent of corporate
activity is sufficient to merit consideration of the legal standing of these public
bodies.5 3 The successful use of these instruments during the first World War
encouraged an extraordinary extension of their use in the New Deal efforts
to combat the depression. This expansion of corporate activity was not only
extensive, but also disorderly. A leading case arose over the legal status of
government corporations created by a government corporation. 4 Corporations
were created by executive order in other states or in the District of Columbia.
In addition, Congress also created some. This lack of uniformity in creation
produced a great variety of legal problems, such as questions of jurisdiction
and removal.
In 1945 Congress passed the Government Corporation Control Act.5 This
enactment brought all government corporations under the close scrutiny of
Congress, required an annual budget in prescribed form and provided for an
annual audit by the General Accounting Office. A further provision required
that all existing government corporations created under the laws of any state
or territory or of the District of Columbia were to be dissolved and were to
be reincorporated by Congress. 56 An early reaction to the Act was that "Amer-
ican experience with autonomous corporations is substantially at an end." 57
Time will determine the accuracy of this conclusion. What does appear certain
is that Congress has imposed upon the incorporated instrumentalities of the
federal government a uniformity of control. If carried much further this
would substantially weaken any judicial assertion that, in the absence of
statute, the congressional intent was to create a legal entity whose standing in
the courts would be the same as any private individual. In the absence of
53. The pioneer work in the bibliography of this field is VAN DORN, GOVERNMENT
OWNED CORPORATIONS (1926). A later work is that of THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PRO-
PRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES (1937). See also Culp,
Creation of Government Corporations by the National Government, 33 MicH. L. REV.
473 (1935); Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations, 21 VA. L. REV. 351, 465
(1935) ; Schnell, Federally Owned Corporations and Their Legal Problems, 14 N. C. L.
REV. 238, 337 (1936) ; McIntire, Government Corporations as Administrative Agencies.
An Approach, 4 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1936); Pinney, The Legal Status of Federal
Government Corporations, 27 CAL. L. REV. 712 (1939); also Notes in 27 Micu. L. REV.
786 (1929) ; 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 346 (1935). The only article on the legal status of
these corporations since the passage of the Government Corporation Control Act in 1945
appears to be Coffman, Legal Status of Government Corporations, 7 FED. B. J. 389 (1946).
54. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381, 59 Sup.
Ct. 516, 83-L. Ed. 784 (1939).
55. 59 STAT. 597 (1945), 31 U. S. C. A. § 841 (Supp. 1948). See Pritchett, The
Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 40 A-mER. POL. Scr. REV. 495 (1946);
also H. R. REP. No. 853, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
56. 59 STAT. 602 (1945), 31 U. S. C. A. § 869 (Supp. 1948).
57. Pritchett, supra note 55 at 509.
statute, amenability to legal process is most easily found by pointing to
autonomy in fact of the public agency concerned.
The judicial attitude towards government corporations has always been
colored by the fact that they are and can only be appropriate means to carry
out the enumerated powers of Congress. Congress can create such agencies
for no other purpose. In this sense, these corporations are always performing
governmental functions. As such they have been consistently protected from
any attempt by the individual states of the Union to tax or regulate them.
58
But in regard to other problems, such as liability, the status of these corpora-
tions has created many difficulties. Great judges have differed in successive
opinions.5 9
The idea of the immunity of the sovereign was early found in judicial
opinion in America, as has been indicated above.60 But the gradual withdrawal
from governmental "legal irresponsibility" 61 has been continuous. Was a pub-
lic corporation to share this immunity or was it to be liable to process for acts
arising out of transactions with private citizens? If the question is reduced
to when and why is liability allowed, the answer is that four theories, at least,
have received judicial sanction as forming a basis for finding liability. The
courts have held at various times that a corporation is liable (1) when it is
a trading company, (2) when it is an agent of the government, (3) when it
is a separate entity from the government and (4) when Congress expresses
an intent that it shall be so liable. These theories will be discussed in order.
(1) Chief Justice Marshall first presented the idea that "when a govern-
ment becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests itself, so far as
concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and
takes that of a private citizen." 62 As a test for all varieties of such public
58. For denial of right to regulate see Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 41 Sup.
Ct. 16, 65 L. Ed. 126 (1920). "Notwithstanding the corporate entity and its subjection
to suit, the Authority is plainly a governmental agency of the United States, and except
as Congress may otherwise consent, is free from state regulation or control"; therefore
TVA's employees are not covered by Alabama's Workmen's Compensation laws. Posey
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 93 F. 2d 726, 727 (C. C. A. 5th 1937). The leading case
denying the right of state to tax such corporations is McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1819). Home Owners' Loan Corporation not subject to state
recording tax on mortgages. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 308 U. S. 21,
60 Sup. Ct. 15, 84 L. Ed. 11 (1939). Employees of HOLC are subject to a non-dis-
criminatory state income tax. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466,
59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. Ed. 927 (1939). See Stoke, State Taxation and the New Federal
Instrumentalities, 22 IOWA L. REv. 39 (1936).
59. Compare the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1819) and in Bank of the United States v. Planters'
Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. Ed. 244 (U. S. 1824). Also compare the approaches of Mr.
Justice Holmes in Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42
Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. Ed. 762 (1922); United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S.
106, 43 Sup. Ct. 283, 67 L. Ed. 552 (1923) ; and in Clallam County v. United States, 263
U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. Ed. 328 (1923).
60. See supra note 5.
61. Keifer & Keifer v. Recdnstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381, 388, 59
Sup. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784 (1939).
62. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 907, 6 L. Ed. 244
(U. S. 1824). Georgia was one of the incorporators of the Planters' Bank.
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agencies, the criterion presents obvious limitations, and has been seldom used
except when in combination with one or more of the criteria to be considered
below.
63
(2) The leading statement on the liability of the government corporation
when it is an agent of the sovereign was made in Sloan Shipyards v. Emer-
gency Fleet Corporatin.64 Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that from far
back in the common law, it had been the rule that whatever the immunity of
the sovereign might be, none of it accrued to the agent to preserve that agent
from the consequences of his tortious acts. He also found that it was not
possible to universalize -this doctrine into a consistent conception of the gov-
ernment corporation in our society. A year later he found that the funds of
the United States Grain Corporation were in fact funds of the United States.
He distinguished the Sloan case by saying that "imponderables have weight." 65
About the same time he refused to permit a county to tax an instrumentality
of the United States-the United States Spruce Corporation.66
Treatment of the corporation as the agent of the government has produced
apparently irreconcilable results. The agent does not have the immunity of
the sovereign principal ;67 but the sovereign, as a disclosed principal, may sue
on the contracts of his agent ;68 the agent is not, as disclosed agent, liable on
contracts made by it for the sovereign, 69 but then again, such an agent may
be liable if such contracts are executed in the agent's own name.70 The agency
theory of these corporations had, at best, an ad hoc usefulness, but clearly
produced no consistency so long as the courts felt impelled to protect the
government from its citizens.
(3) The agency rationale in the Sloan case does not raise any necessary
63. Salas v. United States, 234 Fed. 842, 844 (C. C. A. 2d 1916) ; The No. 34, 11
F. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1925); United States v. Skinner & Eddy Corp., 28 F. 2d 373
(W. D. Wash. 1928).
64. 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. Ed. 762 (1922).
65. United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S. 106, 43 Sup. Ct. 283, 67 L.
Ed. 552 (1923).
66. Clallam County v'. United States, 263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. Ed.
328 (1923).
67. An agent in a private capacity is not immune; an agent in a governmental
capacity is. Cases in which the corporation was immune are Ballaine v. Alaska Northern
Ry. Co., 259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th 1919) (tort action) ; Keeley v. Kerr, 270 Fed. 874
(D. Ore. 1921) (probably overruled by Sloan case) ; Clallam County v. United States,
263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. Ed. 328 (1923) (corporation an agent but solely
for war purposes and therefore not taxable) ; Southern Bridge Co. v. Emergency Fleet
Corp., 266 Fed. 747 (S. D. Ala. 1920) (probably overruled by Sloan case).
68. Tanner-Gross & Co. v. Elwell & Co., 2 F. 2d 396 (S. D. N. Y. 1924): United
States v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 40 F. 2d 214 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S.
844 (1930). If contract is under seal, no party not signing may sue on it and therefore
even though the corporation signed as representing the United States, the United States
not being a signatory could not sue on it. United States v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,
52 F. 2d 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1931). Contra: Crane v. United States, 55 F. 2d 734 (Ct. CI.
1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 601 (1932).
69. United States v. Skinner & Eddy Corp., 28 F. 2d 373 (W. D. Wash. 1928).
70. Merchant Fleet Corp. v. Harwood, 281 U. S. 519, 50 Sup. Ct. 372, 74 L. Ed.
1011 (1930).
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inference of immunity. The Secretary of State is as much an agent 71 or in-
strumentality of the government as is the Emergency Fleet Corporation. For
this reason, many courts made liability turn upon the nature of the agent, in
particular, an agent who was clearly a separate entity from the government.
When a public body was incorporated in a state, a presumption was raised
that an entity distinct from the sovereign was intended 72 and that such an
entity was not to share in the immunities of the sovereign. Incorporation,
wherever it took place, created a separate entity distinct from the stockholders,
even though the sole stockholder might be fhe government.73 Under this
theory, whatever the immunities of the stockholders, none accrued to the
corporation.
These approaches to the problem are today on an insecure foundation
in the light of the Government Corporation Control Act and the spreading
attack upon the entity theory of the corporation. Congress is manifesting no
clear-cut intent to create agencies very far divorced from it, and these corpora-
tions are now chartered only by Congress. Further, the courts have often dis-
regarded the corporate entity to protect government interests when the
occasion demanded.74 The occasions upon which this process has taken place
have been such as to permit an inference that the government has been favored
almost exclusively. One observer of these varying judicial attitudes has re-
ferred to the "chameleonic quasi-private, quasi-pulic corporate form," 75
71. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. Ed. 171 (1882) (while
the United States cannot be sued without its consent, this does not preclude suit against
an agent of the United States wrongfully holding property, even though such holding
is in the name of the United States).
72. The difference in status is sometimes indicated by contrasting "private" and
"public." Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81, 61 Sup. Ct.
485, 85 L. Ed. 595 (1941) ; Panama R. Co. v. Curran, 256 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 5th 1919)
(rejects agency theory but also adopts corporate entity theory) ; Cohn v. United States
Shipping Board, 20 F. 2d 56 (C. C. A. 6th 1927) ; or by simply speaking of the separate
entity. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165, 65 L. Ed. 368 (1921).
Manufacturers' Land & Improvement Co. v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 284 Fed. 231, 234
(C. C. A. 3d 1922), aff'd, 264 U. S. 250, 44 Sup. Ct. 314, 68 L. Ed. 664 (1924) ("The
meaning of incorporation is that the corporate entity is a person, and as such is subject
to the general rules of law"); Providence Engineering Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding
Corp., 294 Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 2d 1923), cert. denied, 264 U. S. 586 (1924) ; Emergency
Fleet Corp. v. Tabas, 22 F. 2d 398 (C. C. A. 3d 1927). At other times the difference was
indicated by saying that such a corporation was "meant to be a legal person without
immunity quite as much as any other corporation." Gould Coupler Co. v. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 261 Fed. 716 (S. D. N. Y. 1919); Pope v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 269 Fed.
319 (S. D. Fla. 1920) ; Traylor Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 277
Fed. 248 (E. D. Pa. 1922); Emergency Fleet Corp. v. South Atl. Dry Dock Co., 300
Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 5th 1924).
73. Liability imposed whether government is part owner as in United States v.
Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. Ed. 244 (U. S. 1824) ; or sole owner as in Emergency
Fleet Corp. v. Tabas, 22 F. 2d 398 (C. C. A. 3d 1927).
74. See North Dakota-Montana Wheat Growers' Ass'n v. United States, 66 F. 2d
573 (C. C. A. 8th 1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 672 (1933), where the defendants were
confronted with the United States trying to foreclose a mortgage held by the unincor-
porated Federal Farm Board. No counterclaim was permitted against the government
and the court advised suit against the Board as their only recourse. Query as to whether
suit against the Board would have been allowed initially.




which is but another mode of indicating the uncertainties arising out of the
dual role played by these bodies.
(4) The currently favored rationale is that of Congressional intent.76 In
the creation of its agent, did Congress contemplate making it amenable to the
law as are other private corporations? If the statute is not clear, the courts
search into the purposes of the legislation for implications of such intent.
77
The admission was frankly made that such implications are more easily found
for, say, amenability to judicial process than to liability for taxes.78 The scope
of judicial inquiry when Congress is silent is obvious. If the decisive factor
in determining the judicial attitude to be adopted towards a government
corporation is the clarity with which Congress has indicated the status of such
a body, the problem may reduce itself to one of statutory draftsmanship. Con-
gress must carefully spell out the relationships that such corporations are to
bear to individuals and to the state governments. The problem still remains,
however, of the most desirable relationships to be created.
This discussion of the present judicial opinion towards government cor-
porations should indicate the confusion existent in the field. Prediction from
past cases is not always possible because of the overhanging thought that
"imponderables have weight." 79 But recent pronouncements of the Supreme
Court have'indicated an intention to limit the immunity of the sovereign and
its agents as much as possible.80
The present status of these corporations can perhaps be more clearly
indicated by setting forth their legal problems in terms of the factual situa-
tions, such as torts or crimes, in which these bodies have been involved as
litigants.
(1) Torts. Recovery for the torts of these bodies has been granted and
denied on the various bases indicated above. Corporations have been liable
76. Federal.Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 60 Sup. Ct. 488, 84 L.
Ed. 724 (1940); Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 60 Sup. Ct. 15,
84 L. Ed. 11 (1939) ; Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 55 Sup. Ct. 705, 79
L. Ed. 1408 (1935) ; United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165, 65 L. Ed.
368 (1921).
77. "If the answer is not made plain by the words of the statute, it is necessary to
ascertain by examination of the purposes and organization of the federal farm loan
system, whether immunity from attachment is granted by implication." Federal Land
Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 231-32, 55 Sup. Ct. 705, 79 L. Ed. 1408 (1935).
78. Id. at 237.
79. See supra note 65.
80. "In spawning these corporations during the past two decades, Congress has
uniformly included amenability to law. ... [S]uch a firm practice is partly an indication
of the present climate of opinion which has brought governmental immunity from suit
into disfavor, partly it reveals a definite attitude on the part of Congress which should
be given hospitable scope." Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306
U. S. 381, 390-91, 59 Sup. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784 (1939). "[W]e start from the premise
that . . .waivers by Congress of governmental immunity in case of ... federal instru-
mentalities should be liberally construed. This policy is in line with the current disfavor
of the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit, as evidenced by the increasing
tendency of Congress to waive the immunity where federal governmental corporations
are concerned." Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 245, 60 Sup.
Ct. 488, 84 L. Ed. 724 (1940).
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NOTES
as agents which could not claim the immunity of the sovereign and immune
as insfrumentalities of the sovereign. 81 Because of recent Supreme Court
decisions, it was supposed that the climate of opinion had so changed that a
statement such as that of David Lilienthal that "Few would dispute the
proposition that when the Government enters the business field it should be
subject, equally with any other business enterprise, to liability for its torts," 82
merely stated a truism. But a recent development under. the Federal Tort
Claims Act 83 raises some doubt as to the accuracy of that statement. This Act
provides the exclusive remedy for any tortious act of a federal agency.84 In
the definition of federal agency is found included all government corporations
"whose primary function is to act as, and while acting as, instrumentalities.
or agencies of the United States, whether br not authorized to sue and be
sued in their own names." 85 If this latter clause does not have any limiting
meaning as to the type of corporation involved, it adds nothing to the sentence.
If this clause defining the kinds of agencies liable does not limit suit in tort
against government corporations to special situations, then the only other
meaning it has is to preclude all further suit in tort against all government
corporations. The only judicial decision in the federal courts on this point
to date has reached this latter result -in an action against the Inland Waterways
Corporation. 86 It is submitted that this result is neither desirable nor necessary.
81. Corporations were held liable in tort in Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. Ed. 762 (1922); Panama R. Co. v.
Curran, 256 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 5th 1919); Panama R. Co. v. Minnix, 282 Fed. 47
(C. C. A. 5th 1922). Corporations held not liable in tort in Ballaine v. Alaska Northern
Ry. Co., 259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th 1919); Keeley v. Kerr, 270 Fed. 874 (D. Ore.
1921). The authority of the Sloan case would be greater if Mr. Justice Holmes had not
also written two other opinions on the same subject. In Clallam County v. United States,
263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. '121, 68 L. Ed. 328 (1923), he denied the county the right to
tax the United States Spruce Corporation on the ground that this was an "agent
created ... for the sole purpose of producing a weapon for the war. This is not like the
case of a corporation having its own purposes as well as those of the United States and
interested in profit on its own account." Id. at 345. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1819), indicates that this profit motive is immaterial in that a
majority of the Bank's stock was privately owned and Maryland still could not tax it.
The other case in which Mr. Justice Holmes protected a corporation was in United
States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S. 106, 43 Sup. Ct. 283, 67 L. Ed. 552 (1923),
supra note 65.
82. Lilienthal & Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal Gov-
enment, 54 HARV. L. REv. 545, 567 (1941).
83. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), 28 U. S. C. A. § 921 (Supp. 1948). For critical consider-
ation of the Act, see Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against The Federal Govern-
mnent, 47 COL. L. REv. 722 (1947) ; Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L. J.
534 (1947).
84. Sec. 423 of the Act.
85. Id. § 402(a). Sec. 421(1) excludes from the provisions of the Act "any claim
arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority."
86. Wickman v. Inland Waterways Corp., 78 F. Supp. 284 (D. Minn. 1948). Since
there was no case authority on the point, the court cited two law review articles in
support of its position. The first article, Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A
Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L. J. 1, 10, 62 (1946), clearly supports the position that
suits against the corporation are now ruled out. In accord with this position are a Note,
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 ILL. L. REv. 344, 348-9 (1947), and a speech by Dis-
trict Judge Hulen reprinted in 7 F. R. D. 689, 697 (1948). The second article cited by
the court, Anderson, Recovery from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
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It is not necessary because the very purpose of the Federal Tort Claims
Act was to extend the amenability of public servants to legal process for their
tortious acts. It is not likely that the urge for uniformity was so great as to
produce a contraction in the liability of government corporations. The language
of the Act touching on government corporations should be considered in the
light of the general purpose for which the Act was passed. It should not be
construed to restrict the scope of liability when enacted for the very purpose
of extending it. Certainly the Inland Waterways Corporafion is the very type
of public body that under any theory of liability has always been held un-
equivocally to have a standing in the courts that was the exact equivalent of
the ordinary private citizen.
The result was not desirable because now the liability of these corporations
is contracted within the limits imposed by the Act itself. Suit against these
bodies must follow the procedure set forth in the Act. Suit is before a District
Judge, sitting without a jury.87 The statute of limitations is reduced to one
year on all claims.88 The United States is not liable for interest prior to
judgment nor for punitive damages.89 Under heavy penalties, all attorney's
fees are restricted to 20% of the recovery.90 Costs will be allowed against the
government, but such costs will not include attorney's fees. 91 Perhaps the most
important limitation is that a large number of torts are specifically excluded
from the coverage of the Act.
92
(2) Contracts. In respect to contract claims, the United States has per-
mitted suit against itself on claims "not sounding in tort" since 1887.93 This
granted a measure of protection to one dealing with these public bodies re-
gardless of the theory assumed by the court as to their status. But a suit
against a separate entity has important differences when contrasted with suits
against the sovereign that again call for clarification by Congress. The dif-
ferences are indicated in the varying effects of the "sue and be sued" clause
Act, 31 MINN. L. REv. 456, 460-1 (1947), leaves some doubt as to its precise position.
Other articles that find that government corporations under some circumstances may not
be acting as government instrumentalities are Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26 N. C.
L. REV. 119, 122 (1948) ; Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L. J. 534, 538-9
(1947). Apparently contra to the Wicknman case is Wagner v. Panama R. Co., 81 N. Y.
S. 2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (plaintiff suing for damages for personal injuries under Jones
Act; motion to dismiss because exclusive remedy was under Federal Tort Claims Act




90. Sec. 422. For reaction of New York Bar to this clause, see Gellhorn & Schenck,
Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COL. L. REV. 722, 734-5 (1947).
91. Sec. 410(a).
92. Sec. 421(a) forbids suit on claim arising out of act or omission performed with
due care or omission to act, arising out of the statutory duty of the federal agency. Sec.
411(b) forbids suit on any claim-arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit or interference with contract rights.
93. The Tucker Act, 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. A. § 250(1) (1928).
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that has been uniformly included in the enabling acts of these corporations
since the establishment of the first Bank of the United States in 1791.
9 4
Questions arose as to the content of this clause. Was it to be strictly
construed as simply another power given by the sovereign to its instrumentality
or was there an implication that the corpbration was thereby to be in the eyes
of the court only another litigant? Only recently was it decided that the
clause "embraces all civil process incident to the commencement or continuance
of legal proceedings." 95 A corporation may therefore be garnisheed for the
wages of an employee.9 6 If it does not appear to interfere with the perform-
ance of its duties, such body may have its property attached as a normal
incident of bringing suit against it.97 If the corporation loses its suit and
judgment is given against it, the judgment will be paid with the normal
interest,98 and the court costs proper to any other litigant will also be paid.69
The fact that the Federal Tort Claims Act 10o-is not so liberal as this serves
to emphasize the statement that suit against the sovereign is not a satisfactory
substitute for suit against the corporation.
(3) Crimes. When crimes are the matter in issue, the United States has
acted to protect its interests. For example, the question must arise as to
whether a statute protecting the United States from fraud, includes govern-
ment corporations within its coverage. Once again the question is when is
an instrumentality of the United States an agent. The test has been made
clear, if not its application. This test is "bottomed on the broad ground that
the fraud which interferes with the successful operation of the Government
is within the statute." 101 It is certain that the judicial interpretations of what
94. 1 STAT. 192 (1791). This was a valid grant of power. Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 (U. S. 1824).
95. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 245, 60 Sup. Ct. 488,
84 L. Ed. 724 (1940). k
96. Ibid. Accord, Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440 (E. D. Pa.
1919) (Emergency Fleet Corp.). The Burr case must be taken to override McCarthy v.
Merchant Fleet Corp., 53 F. 2d 923 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 547
(1931), which distinguished the power to sue or be sued from garnishment on the basis
that such power is related to the corporation's own duties or liabilities whereas garnish-
ment is not. But a disbursing agent of the government may not be garnisheed. Buchanan
v. Alexander, 4 How. 20, 11 I,. Ed. 857 (U. S. 1845) (purser on a naval vessel).
97. Federal Land Banc v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 55 Sup. Ct. 705, 79 L. Ed. 1408
(1935).
98. National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Parrish, 229 U. S. 494, 33
Sup. Ct. 944, 57 L. Ed. 1296 (1913).1 99. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81, 61 Sup. Ct. 485,
85 L. Ed. 595 (1941).
100. 60 STAT. 846 (1946), 28 U. S. C. A. § 943 (Supp. 1948).
101. Pierce v. United States, 314 U. S. 306, 62 Sup. Ct. 226, 86 L. Ed. 241 (1941)
(impersonation of officer of TVA not within criminal statute against impersonating
officer of the United States). For purposes of criminal law forbidding agent of United
States from being an officer in any corporation with which he was instrumental in having
business relations with government, an inspector of Emergency Fleet Corporation was not
an agent of the United States. United States v. Strang, 254. U. S. 491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165,
65 L. Ed. 368 (1921). Conspiracy to defraud Emergency Fleet Corporation is conspiracy
to defraud the United States and punishable as such. United States v. Union Timber
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interferes with the successful operation of the Government will be many. The
underlying premise is, in fact, just one step beyond this and may be quickly
spelled out by a court's statement that the fraud in question "if successful
would have resulted in a pecuniary loss to the United States" and, almost as
an afterthought, "and even more immediately would have impaired the effi-
ciency of its very important instrument." 102
(4) Public Funds. There has never been any doubt on the part of the
judiciary when it was a question of an immediate loss of public funds. If the
Emergency Fleet Corporation made an overpayment, the United States could
sue for its recovery.103 The Inland Waterways Corporation's bank deposits
are public funds that a national bank may pledge its assets to secure.10 4 When
the FHA had an assigned claim upon which the statute of limitations had
run, suit was permitted because it was acting for the United States in a gov-
ernmental capacity.10 5
CONCLUSION
Such is the status of the government corporations in the United States
and in England. The attempt has been made to show the varying attitudes
that courts have adopted towards them. Clarification in the American approach
is needed. For guidance, the example of England has been pointed out. In Great
Britain great numbers of new public bodies, mostly incorporated, are being
created by the government and all of them seem to be without any special privi-
leges and are required to make their way through the English courts as though
Products Co., 259 Fed. 907 (W. D. Wash. 1919) ; United States v. Carlin, 259 Fed. 904
(E. D. Pa. 1917).
102. United States v. Walter, 263 U. S. 15, 18, 44 Sup. Ct. 10, 68 L. Ed. 137 (1923).
103. Russell Wheel & Foundry Co. v. United States, 31 F. 2d 826 (C. C. A. 6th 1929).
104. Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U. S. 517, 60 Sup. Ct. 646, 84 L. Ed.
901 (1940).
105. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U. S. 414, 60 Sup. Ct. 1019, 84 L. Ed. 1283
(1940). Claims against the United States which are assigned are void; claims against
Emergency Fleet Corporation are freely transferable because corporation is a separate
entity. Providence Engineering Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp., 3 F. 2d 154 (E. D.
N. Y. 1924), cert. denied, 264 U. S. 586 (1924) (also holds that unliquidated claims
against corporation are not claims against the United States). Action on a wrongful death
statute against the corporation was not action against the United States so that the
former action pending against the United States did not expand the statutory period for
bringing the action. Lindgren v. Merchant Fleet Corp., 55 F. 2d 117 (C. C. A. 4th 1932),
cert. denied, 286 U. S. 542 (1931). The status of these corporations in bankruptcies and
equity receiverships is confused. Emergency Fleet Corporation had no priority in bank-
ruptcy because as agent it had not such right which accrued only to sovereign. Sloan Ship-
yards Corp. v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. Ed. 762
(1922) (Taft, C. J., concurred in result but on grounds that such priorities extended only
to tax claims; id. at 574). United States filing a claim on behalf of FHA in state equity
receivership had priority. United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423, 62 Sup. Ct. 317, 86 L.
Ed. 315 (1941) (dissent thought Sloan case should apply; id. at 437 n. 12). Contra as to
Emergency Fleet Corporation: West Virginia Rail Co. v. Jewett Bigelow & Brooks Coal
Co., 26 F. 2d 503 (E. D. Ky. 1928). See Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the
United States in Bankruptcy, and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARv. L. REv. 251 (1929) ;




they were private litigants. It is submitted that this attitude is not only in
accord with our principles of justice but is also necessary to, protect the civil
liberties of private citizens from the pressures of increasing numbers of
public bodies dealing with the ordinary affairs of the citizenry. "We may
conclude with a paradox: In the law of proprietary corporations, the public
interest is best served by fegarding them as private." 106
106. THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
COUNTRIES 103 (1937).
STANLEY D. RosE
